

a. $\Pi_M = p(12 - p) \Rightarrow \max_p$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_M}{\partial p} = 12 - 2p = 0$$

$$p = 6, q = 6, \Pi_M = 6(12 - 6) = 36$$

b. $\begin{cases} \Pi_M = q_M(12 - q_E - q_M) \Rightarrow \max_{q_M} \\ \Pi_E = q_E(12 - q_E - q_M) \Rightarrow \max_{q_E} \end{cases}$

$$Q_{M+E}^C = 8, P = 12 - 8 = 4, \Pi_M = \Pi_E = 4 * 4 = 16$$

c. Reaction function of E: $q_E = 6 - \frac{q_M}{2}$

$$\Pi_M = q_M(12 - q_M - (6 - \frac{q_M}{2})) \Rightarrow \max_{q_M}$$

$$q_M = 6$$

$$q_E = 6 - \frac{6}{2} = 3$$

$$Q_{M+E}^S = 6 + 3 = 9, P = 12 - 9 = 3, \Pi_M = 6 * 3 = 18, \Pi_E = 3 * 3 = 9$$

d. If Entrant does not enter the market his/hers profit is 0. If he/she enters and firms compete under Cournot, Entrant's profit 16. So, $f_{max}^C = 16$.

e. If Entrant does not enter the market his/hers profit is 0. If he/she enters and firms compete under Stackelberg, Entrant's profit 9. So, $f_{max}^S = 9$.

f. $\Pi_E = K_E(12 - K_M - K_E)$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_E}{\partial K_E} = 12 - K_M - 2K_E = 0$$

$$K_E = \frac{12 - K_M}{2} = 6 - \frac{K_M}{2} \text{ (RFe)}$$

M deters entrant and sets K_M^* such that $K_E^*(12 - K_M^* - K_E^*) = f$

$$K_M^* = 12 - 2\sqrt{f}, (f \leq 36)$$

g. M will deter entrance iff profit from deterrence is higher than profit from accomdation (IC constraint)

If M accomodates entrance:

$$\Pi_M = 6(12 - 6 - 3) = 6 * 3 = 18$$

M decides to deter entrance iff:

$$(12 - 2\sqrt{f}) * (12 - (12 - 2\sqrt{f})) > 18$$

$$0.77 < f < 26.2$$

Deterrence also has an additional cost: M could not charge more than

$$p_M^D < p_M; 2\sqrt{f} < 6; f < 9$$

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{deters, if } 0.79 < f \text{ (when } f \geq 9 \text{ stars behaving as monopolist setting } p_M = 6) \\ \text{accommodates, otherwise} \end{array} \right.$

h. if M deters loss is $36 - (12 - 2\sqrt{f})2\sqrt{f}$ (for $0.79 < f < 9$)

if f is high enough ($9 \leq f$) monopolistic price is feasible, so there is no losses

if M accommodates loss is $36 - 18 = 18$ and it does not depend on f