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# Lecture 22

## Antitrust



Industrial  
Economics

Policy

## Policy and goals

- ★ Firms tend to behave in ways that reduce **social welfare**  
industrial policy and regulation may be **necessary**
- ★ Policy **sets rules** for competition to improve **efficiency**
- ★ But **what is** efficiency?
  1. **Static allocative** efficiency  
who gains what **surplus** and how much **DWL** is created
  2. **Static productive** efficiency  
the internal efficiency of firms, what to **produce** and how?
  3. **Dynamic** efficiency: both allocative or productive  
what is optimal now may not be optimal in a **longer horizon**.

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## The goal is not straightforward

1. One thing is fixed but **another breaks** down
  - ◆ A **merger** can reduce costs but can reduce competition, too
  - ◆ Policy to **incentivize R&D** might create barriers in the future
2. The result on **welfare** might be **ambiguous**  
for instance, the implementation of **RPM**
3. Should we **target** for efficiency or welfare?  
**protect** the consumer or the small businesses?
4. Industrial policies **conflict** with other policies  
should you allow **domestic** firms to merge in order to improve their positions against **international** rivals? \_

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Policy

## The problem of measuring market power

It is hard to **measure** market power

- ★ **Detection** or **proof** of market exploitation might be **hard**
- ★ What level of market power is **acceptable**?
- ★ Even when the welfare implications are straightforward, what if market power is not **fully used**?
- ★ What if market power **is fair** because of innovation or efficiency? \_

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Policy

## More problems with market power

It is hard to answer **more fundamental** questions

- ★ What is the relevant **product**?
- ★ How to define the (geographical) **market**?
- ★ How to **calculate cost** or **demand** with limited access to info?
- ★ How to determine the **dynamics** that influence market power **persistence** in time? \_

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## Measurement of market power

- ★ Price - cost **margins** and **profitability**
- ★ Estimates of the **elasticity of demand** for the product  
high elasticity would suggest low market power
- ★ Volatility of **market shares** in the industry  
high volatility may indicate low persistence of market power
- ★ Estimates of **degree of substitution** between products
- ★ Competition **extent** (local, national or international)
- ★ Existence of artificial entry **barriers**
- ★ Bargaining power of **buyers** \_

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## Measurement distortions

- ★ None of those indices can tell the story without **distortion**
- ★ While one index shows market power another might indicate the **opposite**
- ★ We should be **careful** when we use those indices for the sake of policy

## Categories of policy

- ★ We will focus on the **economic background** of the **legislative** and **institutional** frameworks in every jurisdiction
- ★ There are **three categories** of market policy
  1. **Antitrust** policy: ensures that **competition** is not hindered
  2. **Industrial** policy: promotes the inter-temporally optimal allocation of **resources**
  3. **Development** policies: incentivize the firms to undertake appropriate **investments** when market fails to do so

## Methods of policy

There are **two approaches** to policy:

1. **Rules** – specific laws that define actions and reactions
  - ◆ **Advantages:** **objectivity**, **clear-cut** conviction, **signaling** to industry for the government's intentions
  - ◆ **Disadvantages:** cannot consider **qualitative** differences, legal **loopholes**
2. **Discretion (rule of reason)** – case by case examination
  - ◆ **Advantages:** ideally **specific** to each case
  - ◆ **Disadvantages:** high administrative **costs**, **corruption**, **lobbying**


## Limiting market power

- ★ Market power **harms** some players in the market – buyer or seller
  - ◆ Reduces output, leading to **deadweight loss**
  - ◆ Raises problems of **equity** and **fairness**
- ★ What can we do to **limit** market power and keep it from being used anti-competitively?
  - ◆ prevent firms from acquiring excessive power

## Antitrust authority

- ★ In every country there is a **national trade and antitrust Authority** in charge of protecting healthy competition
- ★ Most systems use **sequential mixture** of rules and discretion
- ★ In case the Authority **identifies** violation of rules
  - ◆ It can propose to **settle** with the perpetrator with a fine or even jail time
  - ◆ Take the case to **trial** via the national judicial system

## The judicial system



## Antitrust laws

- ★ **Rules and regulations** designed to promote a competitive economy by
  - ◆ Prohibiting **actions** that restrain or are likely to restrain competition
  - ◆ Restricting the **forms** of allowable market structures
- ★ Market power arises in a **number of ways**, each of which is **covered** by the antitrust laws.

## Sherman Act (1890) – section 1

- ★ Prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in **restraint of trade**
  - ◆ Explicit agreement to **restrict output** or **fix prices**
  - ◆ Implicit collusion through **parallel conduct**
  - ◆ **Example:** In 1999, four of the world's largest drug and chemical companies were found guilty of fixing prices of vitamins sold in US.

## Sherman Act (1890) – section 2

- ★ Makes it illegal to “**monopolize**” a market and prohibits conspiracies that result in monopolization
  - ◆ It is **OK** if a firm gets the entire market because of **superior skill and intelligence** when nobody else could do it as well as this firm
  - ◆ It is **not OK** if a firm gets the entire market by the **use of means** which made it impossible for other firms to engage in fair competition.

## Clayton Act (1914)

1. Makes it unlawful to require a buyer or lessor **not to buy** from a competitor
2. Prohibits **predatory pricing**
3. Prohibits **mergers** and **acquisitions** if they “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly”.

## Federal Trade Commission Act (1914)

1. Created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
  2. Supplements the Sherman and Clayton Acts by fostering competition through a set of prohibitions against unfair and **anticompetitive practices**
- ★ Prohibitions against
    - ◆ Deceptive **advertising**
    - ◆ Deceptive **labeling**
    - ◆ **Agreements** to exclude competing brands from retailing.

## Robinson - Patman Act (1936)

- ★ **Prohibits** price discrimination if it causes buyers to suffer **economic damages** and **competition is reduced**
- ★ Requires that the seller offers the **same price terms** to customers at a given level of trade
  - ◆ Only for **tangible goods**, not services
  - ◆ Covers **inputs markets** only
- ★ Outside of the Act's conditions, **pricing mechanisms** can yield wildly different prices for different customers.

## Antitrust legislation in Russia

- ★ Antitrust issues in Russia are regulated by one law: **Federal Law No. 135-FZ**, “On the Protection of Competition” (2006)
- ★ The “**3rd antimonopoly package**”, which entered into force in January 2012, is indicative of a general trend of liberalization of antimonopoly regulation
  - indeed, its stated aim was to bring Russia more in line with **European** competition regulations
- ★ The **Code of Administrative Offences** includes measures

## Federal Law No. 135-FZ

- ★ Defines thresholds for **excess market power** (dominance)
  - ◆ A company is “presumed dominant” if it has **more than 50%** of market share
  - ◆ Dominance must be established by Federal Antimonopoly Service (Федеральная антимонопольная служба России, ФАС России) if a company has **more than 35%** of market share
  - ◆ A company with **less than 35%** of market share is generally not considered dominant
- ★ The law places restrictions on **aids from the government** that discourage competition

## Code of Administrative Offences

- ★ Amended to increase **liability** of anti-competitive practices and now includes **measures** against such practices
- ★ Company directors can be **criminally liable** in cases of a repeated offense (7 years in prison)
- ★ Practices that are considered illegal include
  - ◆ **Establishing monopoly** prices,
  - ◆ Unjustified evasion from the **execution of contracts** with individual customers,
  - ◆ Creation of **obstacles** for other entities entering the market

## Antitrust in practice

- ★ **Evidence** for conspiracy for agreement is **sufficient for conviction**
  - regardless* of the actual **effectiveness** in creating market power
- ★ **Price-fixing** and customer **allocations** are per se illegal
  - other types of agreements* are judged under a rule of reason
- ★ In general, **parallel pricing** is **not sufficient** evidence
  - ◆ **Cannot tell** if it is due to an agreement or done independently
  - ◆ Was **never upheld** as proof at the US Supreme Court
  - ◆ **Conscious parallelism**: independent pricing by firms that are aware of the parallel pricing of their rivals

## Legal process

- ★ The **courts** attempt to determine:
  - ◆ The **effect** of the agreement on **competition**
  - ◆ Whether there are **benefits** that justify the agreement
- ★ There are distinguished **3 sets** of circumstances:
  1. **Common course is obvious** but no direct evidence of an explicit agreement exists
  2. **Signaling methods** are used to exchange mutual assurances and identify a common course of action (second best)
  3. **Tacit collusion** – firms coordinate by observing and anticipating the price movements of their rivals

## Burden of proof

- ★ **Factors** that allow **inference** of an agreement include
  - ◆ Econometric evidence
  - ◆ Hard evidence of **direct communication** between executives
  - ◆ **Facilitating practices**
    - ◆ Evidence that firms **acted contrary** to their unilateral self-interest (for instance, by raising prices in a recession)
- ★ A finding that firms would **not have** market power from agreement is usually enough for a **dismissal**
- ★ The problem is that the antitrust law expects from firms to behave **dynamically irrationally**
  - to **not consider** the behavior and reaction of their rivals

## Enforcement of antitrust laws

- ★ US antitrust laws are **stricter** and more **far reaching** than the rest of the world
  - some have claimed this has hindered US **competing in international markets**
- ★ With growth of European Union, methods of antitrust enforcement have **evolved**
  - ◆ Similar to US laws with some procedural and substantive differences
  - ◆ Europe only imposes **civil** penalties

Thank you!



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