



Lecture 10
Short-run GDP Fluctuations

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Economics
& Society

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Previously in E&S...

- ★ Definition of money
 - functions and properties of money
- ★ Intrinsic value vs. fiat money
- ★ The banking system
 - CB – commercial banks
- ★ The money supply
- ★ The money demand
 - for transactions – precaution – speculation
- ★ Equilibrium interest rate and monetary policy
- ★ Inflation  

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Short-run GDP Fluctuations
Estimated duration: 100min

 PARTICIPANTS OF THE COMMODITY MARKET	 EQUILIBRIUM AT THE COMMODITY MARKET	 LINKS BETWEEN MARKETS
 FISCAL POLICY	 MONETARY POLICY	 ECONOMIC CRISIS

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LINKS BETWEEN MARKETS

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Investment & the real interest rate

> Links between markets

* Assume that there exist 14 **investment projects** for \$100 each, expected to yield the following **per year returns**:

9%, 9%, 7%, 5%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 1%, 1%, 1%

▶ If you had \$1,400 and the **interest rate** was 4.5% how much would you invest?

9%, 9%, 7%, 5%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 1%, 1%, 1% $6 \cdot \$100 = \600

▶ If you had \$1,400 and the **interest rate** was 3.5%?

9%, 9%, 7%, 5%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 1%, 1%, 1% $8 \cdot \$100 = \800

▶ If the **interest rate** was 2.5%?

9%, 9%, 7%, 5%, 5%, 5%, 4%, 4%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 1%, 1%, 1% $9 \cdot \$100 = \900

* **Investment** is **inversely related** to the **real interest rate** [L2]

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Links between markets

> Links between markets

* **Output** is transacted using **money**:

▶ The equilibrium **output** is determined in the **commodity market**

▶ The equilibrium **real interest rate** is determined in the **money market**.

* The two markets are **connected** with each-other through **2 links**:

* **Link 1**: From the **commodity** market to the **money** market

Increase in Y^* → Increase in M_D

* **Link 2**: From the **money** market to the **commodity** market

Increase in r^* → decrease in I

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Fiscal policy

> Fiscal policy

* The government can **boost** Y by either expanding G or contracting t
these practices are known as **Expansionary Fiscal Policy**

* Both alternatives may cause **budget deficits**

that is, $G > T$

* Deficits are **funded** by issuing **government securities**
effectively **borrowing** from households and firms at an **interest**

* Past years' deficits **pile up** forming the **government debt**

* If the "**debt / GDP**" ratio becomes too high, lenders will **stop buying** securities
this may lead to a **fiscal crisis**

* Decrease in G or increase in t are referred to as **Contractionary Fiscal Policy**

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
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Link 1 with fiscal policy !

> Fiscal policy

- ★ Commodity market **equilibrates** at Y_0^* and money market at r_0^*
- ★ An **increase in G** shifts the equilibrium in the commodity market to Y_1^*
- ★ M_D **shifts** to M'_D
- ★ r_0^* will tend to **rise** to r_1
- ★ **Unless** M_S shifts to M'_S to **keep** the rate at r_0^*



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Monetary policy

> Monetary policy

- ★ A change in r will affect Y though I via link 2
- ★ **Expansionary Monetary Policy**: CB decreases r^* , to increase I , to increase Y^* to stimulate the economic activity when a **recession** is feared
- ★ **Contractionary Monetary Policy**: CB increases r^* , to decrease I , to decrease Y^* to **ease inflation** by decreasing the money supply.

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
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Link 2 with monetary policy !

> Monetary policy

- ★ Markets initially **equilibrate** at Y_0^* and r_0^*
- ★ CB **decreases** rate to r_1^*
- ★ Investment **increases** to I_1 :
 - ▶ **Output** equilibrates at Y_1^*
 - ▶ M_D **shifts** to M'_D .
- ★ **Money supply** must **rise** further to **prevent** the interest rate from increasing to r_2 .



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External video

Let's watch a 5 min lesson for the Great Depression.

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The 2007-09 Financial Crisis > Crisis > The 2007-09 Crisis

- ★ In the years before 2007 several new unregulated **shadow banks** had appeared those institutions started offering some new **“innovative” financial products**
- ★ One of those was to **package together high-risk** mortgage loans:
 - ▶ When you loan \$1,000 at 10% to **one debtor** with 2% risk of default, you face 98% probability to earn \$100 and 2% probability of losing \$1,000
 - ▶ When you loan \$1 at 10% to **1,000 debtors** with 2% risk of default, it is almost certain that you will earn around \$80.
- ★ This **works great** but it has **3 important limitations**:
 1. The law of averages applies **only in normal times**
 2. The “feeling of **false safety**” made banks to neglect proper due diligence
 3. The over-supply of loans led the housing market to a **speculative bubble**.

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History repeats itself > Crisis > The 2007-09 Crisis

- ★ In the first sight of **recession, mortgage defaults** snowballed many banks had **invested heavily** in such MBS and could **not survive the losses**
- ★ Government and the Fed came to an **ethical dilemma**: have **taxpayers cover** the losses or let the economy **sink**?
- ★ The 2007-09 crisis was basically a **repetition** of the Great Depression:
 - ▶ In the Great Depression the bubble was the **stock market**
 - ▶ In the 2007-09 Crisis the bubble was the **housing market**.
- ★ Both happened because of **regulation gaps** in the financial markets
- ★ The 2007-09 Crisis, however, **lasted way less** because it was extinguished successfully with **expansionary policy**.

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The Greek Debt Crisis 2008 – today

> Crisis > The Greek Crisis

- ★ The Greek crisis was a **national debt** crisis
- ★ During the **80s and 90s** Greece was running on deficits mainly **financed with seignorage**
- ★ In **2002** the country entered the **Eurozone** as a founding member:
 - ▶ Greece could **no more** fund its deficits by **printing money**
 - ▶ But it could finance its spending with **cheap loans** in its new currency.
- ★ While the country was living lavishly on credit, **debt kept piling up**
- ★ By 2008 Greece had an official **debt / GDP ratio at 115%** in **reality** it was 127%
- ★ At the same time, global financial crisis, made investors overly **averse to risk**.

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The weak link

> Crisis > The Greek Crisis

- ★ Within months **interest rates** for Greek bonds exploded to 30%! all outstanding Greek securities were **rated as “trash”**
- ★ Greece was in the **middle of a deep recession** with **nothing** to fight it:
 - ▶ **Monetary policy** was in the hands of the ECB
 - ▶ **The government** had no money to conduct fiscal policy.
- ★ The IMF, the ECB and the European Commission **bailed out** urgent loans under 2 **conditions**: **severe austerity** and **drastic reforms**
- ★ Within **10 years**: **GDP** fell by 30%, **unemployment** exceeded 25%, **infrastructure** deteriorated, **6 governments** were changed the nation's **morale** collapsed
- ★ Today, the **only hope** is **tourism**, **exports** and **foreign investments**.

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Thank you!

(you are welcomed to stay for *consultation* or *discussion*)

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