

Lecture 4

Market power – part II



micro2
first module (m2)

Pricing: monopoly vs. PC

★ Monopoly

$$p > MC$$

price exceeds MC by an amount that depends inversely on the *elasticity* of demand

★ Perfect Competition

$$p = MC$$

demand for the firm is *perfectly elastic* at $p = MC$

Taxation


★ Consider a *specific tax* on a good sold in a perfectly competitive market

a *fixed* ruble amount *over the price* of the good

★ The per-unit tax causes price to rise by *less than the tax*

the tax burden is *split* between the consumer and the producer

A specific tax in PC




Taxation to a monopoly

★ How is a tax going to affect a monopolistic market?

★ A fixed tax will *affect the MC* of the firm

$$MC' = MC + t$$

Fixed tax on monopolist – graph



Effect of fixed tax on monopolist

- ★ The amount the price increases due to the tax **depends** on **elasticity of demand**
- ★ Price **may** or **may not** increase by more than the tax
- ★ **Profits** for monopolist will **fall** with a tax
- ★ In a **competitive market**, the price **cannot increase** by more than tax

Multi-plant monopoly

- ★ For some firms, production takes place in **more than one plant**
- ★ What if each plant has **different costs**?
- ★ How will the firm **distribute production** between both plants?
 - ◆ $MC_1 + MC_2 = MR$?
 - ◆ $MR = \min(MC_1, MC_2)$?
 - ◆ $MR = \log(MC_1 + MC_2/3.14) - 7/8$?

Profit maximization in plant 1

- ★ Consider a firm who owns **two plants** with **cost** $C_1(q_1)$ and $C_2(q_2)$
- ★ **Demand** for the good is $p(Q)$ that is $p(q_1 + q_2)$
- ★ Let's set up the **profit** function

$$\Pi = p(q_1 + q_2) \cdot (q_1 + q_2) - C_1(q_1) - C_2(q_2)$$
- ★ **Maximizing** with respect to q_1

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial q_1} = \frac{\partial [p(q_1 + q_2) \cdot (q_1 + q_2)]}{\partial q_1} - \frac{\partial C_1}{\partial q_1} = MR - MC_1 = 0$$
- ★ Thus, profit maximizing **condition** is $MR = MC_1$


Profit maximization with 2 plants

- ★ We can show **the same** for plant 2

$$MR = MC_2$$
- ★ Therefore, we can conclude that the firm should choose to **produce** where

$$MR = MC_1 = MC_2$$
- ★ Lets see it graphically...

Production with two plants



- ★ $MR = MC_T$ gives total output
- ★ This point shows the MR^* for each plant

$$MR^* \text{ crosses } MC_1 \text{ \& } MC_2 \text{ at the profit maximizing output for each plant}$$

Example – producing an additional unit

Q	TC ₁	TC ₂	Q _{total}	Q ₁	Q ₂	TC
1	1	3	1	1	0	1
2	2	4	2	2	0	2
3	3	5	3	3	0	3
4	5	7	4	4	0	5
5	7	9	5	5	0	7
6	11	13	6	5	1	7+3 = 10
7	20	32	7	5	2	7+4 = 11

- ★ You want to **start using** your least effective plant as the increase in production causes your effective plant to hit the **diseconomies** of scale

Market power with more than one firms

- ★ **Market power** is the ability of charging $p > MC$
- ★ This can happen **even** if the firm is **not alone** in the market
- ★ A firm has market power when **it faces a downward sloping demand curve**
- ★ Pure monopoly is **rare** but its **principles** can be applied to firms that **possess some market power**

Assessing market power

- ★ We **measure** market power by the extent to which **price exceeds the MC**
- ★ For this purpose, we use the **Lerner's index**

$$L \equiv \frac{p - MC}{p}$$

the **larger** the index the greater the power

- ★ Recall that

$$L = \frac{1}{\epsilon_d}, \quad \epsilon_d: \text{ for the firm}$$

Market power and profits

- ★ Market power **does not guarantee** profits
- ★ If the product has **insufficient demand**, monopolization will not help
- ★ Profit depends on **average cost** relative to **price**
- ★ A firm may have **more market power** but **lower profits** due to high average costs

Supermarkets & convenience stores

Supermarket

- ◆ Cheaper **prices**
- ◆ Takes more **time** to shop
- ◆ **Far** away from customers
- ◆ Store **elasticity** -10
- ◆ **Markup** calculated to 10%

Convenience store

- ◆ More **expensive**
- ◆ **Quicker** service
- ◆ **Closer** to customer
- ◆ Store **elasticity**, near -5
- ◆ **Markup** much higher, 20%

- ★ Convenience store has **more market power** higher **profit margin** than supermarket
- ★ Supermarkets have usually **higher profit**, however **higher volume** of sales and **lower AC**


The rule-of-thumb revisited

- ★ Optimal pricing for **any firm** with market power

$$p = MC \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_d + 1}\right)$$

- ★ Now ϵ_d is the elasticity of demand **for the brand**
 - ◆ **Elastic** products will have a **low** markup
 - ◆ **Inelastic** products will have a **high** markup

Elasticity and profit margin / markup



Creating market power

- ★ Make your product **better**
differentiate your product so that consumers cannot *substitute it easily* with other products
- ★ Close the **door** behind you
create **barriers to entry** so that potential competitors will keep out of your profits
- ★ **Kill** the competition
 - ◆ Not literally!
 - ◆ Apply strategies that can constrict the competition and **drive rivals out** of business

Sources of market power

- ★ **Why** do some firms have considerable market power, and others have **little or none**?
- ★ Market power is determined by **ability** to set price above MC
- ★ This is affected by the **firm's elasticity of demand**
firms with **inelastic** demand curve, have more market power
- ★ The firm's elasticity of demand is **determined by**:
 1. Elasticity of **market demand**
 2. The **number of firms** in market
 3. The **intensity of competition** among firms

1. Elasticity of market demand

- ★ With one firm, the market demand and the firm's demand curve **coincide**
market power is determined **completely** by elasticity of market demand
- ★ With more firms, individual demand **will differ** from market demand
- ★ Demand for a firm's product is **more elastic** than the market elasticity
- ★ **Why?**

2. Number of firms


- ★ The market power of a firm **falls** as the number of firms **increases**; all else equal
 - ◆ More importantly, the number of firms with **significant market share**
 - ◆ Market is **highly concentrated** if only a few firms account for most of the sales
 - ◆ Incumbent firms would like to create **barriers to entry** to keep new firms out of market

3. Intensity of competition

- ★ Firms can be **aggressive** in gaining market share
undercutting, offers, aggressive R&D etc.
- ★ Then **prices** may **fall** close to **competitive levels**
- ★ In other industries firms **collude**
agree to **moderate** competition
- ★ Firms can co-exist with **substantial market power**
- ★ Markets are **dynamic** and therefore, so is the concept of market power

Efficiency of non-competitive markets

- ★ Market power results in **higher prices** and **lower quantities**
- ★ However, does market power **improve or worsen** market **efficiency**?
- ★ We can **compare CS** and **PS** under **PC** and under **monopoly**



Efficiency

Social costs of monopoly

- ★ The **social cost** of monopoly is likely to **exceed** the deadweight loss
- ★ **Rent Seeking**: firms may use resources to gain market power instead of using them in the production process
 - lobbying, advertising, building excess capacity
- ★ The **incentive** to engage in monopoly practices is determined by the profit to be gained
 - the transfer from consumers to the firm

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ευχαριστώ!
(thank you!)

- Kosmas Marinakis
- www.kmarinakis.org
- kmarinakis@hse.ru
- kosmas_marinakis
- Kosmas Marinakis
- t.me/kosmas_teaching
- @Kos_Marinakis

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